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AGENCY-CONTRACTS-EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL REAL ESTATE
Plaintiff, a real estate broker, was engaged by the executor of
an estate to sell a tract of land consisting of several parcels. All
inquiries were to be directed to the plaintiff and all sales made
through him but if no sales were made he was to receive no com-
pensation for his services. No time limit was set as to the duration
of the relationship. After six parcels were sold the plaintiff re-
ceived two bids for the last remaining parcel, both of which were
rejected by the defendant. Thereupon the defendant sold the par-
cel himself. Plaintiff brought this action to recover the commission
on the last parcel sold. In the trial court the issues of fact and law
were submitted without a jury and the court found for the plaintiff
on both law and fact. Held, affirmed, a reasonable time had not
passed to terminate the agency and since the plaintiff had an ex-
clusive right of sale, he should recover. Richter v. First National
Bank, 51 Ohio L. Abs. 113, 80 N.E. 2d 243 (App. 1947).
The court viewed the facts as creating a binding promise on
the part of the defendant to pay a commission if the parcel were
sold within a reasonable time. The court did not expressly state
whether a bilateral obligation existed, that is, whether there was a
duty on the part of the broker to continue once he started render-
ing services, or whether there was an offer for a unilateral contract
that had become irrevocable by the rendition of services.
Courts have long drawn a distinction between "exclusive agency"
and "exclusive right to sell." In the "exclusive agency" situation
the owner can himself compete with the agent without liability but
he cannot hire others to do so. Dole v. Sherwood; 41 Minn. 535, 43
N.W. 569 (1889); Turner v. Baker, 225 Pa. 359, 74 Atl. 172 (1909).
If it is an "exclusive right to sell" no competition by the vendor is
permitted. Lapham v. Flint, 86 Minn. 376, 90 N.W. 780 (1902);
Stringfellow v. Powers, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 199, 23 S.W. 313 (1893).
Most jurisdictions view .a relationship such as this, where there
is no express promise to use reasonable efforts, as merely an offer for
a unilateral contract, the offer being accepted by the expenditure
of money and effort to find a purchaser. Braniff v. Baier, 101 Kan.
117, 165 Pac. 816 (1917); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Lamar, 148 Mo.
App. 353, 128 S.W. 20 (1910). Ohio law however is unsettled on
this point. Dictum in one supreme court decision, where there was
no express promise to use reasonable efforts, seems to indicate that
there is an offer for a unilateral contract being accepted only by
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producing a purchaser. Brenner v. Spiegel, 116 Ohio St. 631, 157
N.E. 491 (1926). This dictum was approved by one lower court de-
cision. Schoenl v. Warner White Co., 32 Ohio App. 59, 167 N.E. 598
(1928). There is however some disagreement at this appellate level.
Stroffregen v. Roney, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 118 (App. 1933). The signifi-
cance of such a view is that no efforts or expenses such as advertis-
ing, travel, etc., can constitute an acceptance of the offer. This view
would seem to be opposed to the weight of authority and has drawn
criticism. 6 OHIO Jim. 182 (1929).
In the principal case the court did not rely on the orthodox
rules to decide when an offer such as this is accepted so as to be
binding, but rather decided that the promise was binding upon the
basis of promissory estoppel. While there is a paucity of cases on
the subject in Ohio, one court of appeals case has expressly adopted
Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. Saunders v. Galbraith,
40 Ohio App. 155, 178 N.E. 34 (1931). There a gratuitous promise
by a widow to sell her own property to pay her deceased husband's
debts if creditors would not file a claim against the estate was made
binding after the creditors relied on her promise and allowed the
time of filing to pass. The case has been approved by law journal
writers, noting however that actual consideration may have been
present. 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 594 (1931); 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 493
(1931). Even before the Restatement, Ohio applied a similar doc-
trine to charitable subscription cases. Ohio Wesleyan Female Col-
lege v. Higgens, 16 Ohio St. 20 (1864); Commissioners Canal Fund
v. Perry, 5 Ohio 56 (1831). In view of the lack of authority how-
ever a dogmatic assertion that Ohio has, and will apply, the doctrine
in the future cannot be made.
This case is significant in that it shows the tendency of the Ohio
2ourts to recognize the inherent justice in the application of Sec-
tion 90 of the Restatement. It leaves undecided the question of
when such an offer is accepted and becomes binding on orthodox
contract rules.
Earl E. Stephenson
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
Defendant, a Michigan corporation, owns a small island on the
Canadian side of the Detroit River and operates it as an amusement
park, providing exclusive transportation to the island from Detroit.
Pursuant to the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MICH. Covp'. LAWS
§§ 17115-146-17115-148 (Mason Cum. Supp. 1940), defendant was
convicted of discrimination in refusing passage and admission to a
negro girl. These statutes provide, inter alia, criminal and civil
sanctions for the denial of equal accommodations and uniform
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prices for all citizens on public conveyances. Defendant attacked
the constitutionality of this application of the Act to foreign com-
merce. Held, the Michigan Civil Rights Act was properly applied.
It is local in effect, does not impose an undue burden on foreign
commerce, and is not inconsistent with federal and Canadian policy.
Conviction affirmed. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 68 Sup.
Ct. 358 (1948).
The majority opinion avoided the line of cases which holds that
federal power over interstate commerce is exclusive, and therefore,
no state regulation is possible except by Congressional consent. Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824); Helson v. Kentucky, 279
U. S. 249 (1929). Instead, the Court declared that some state action
must be valid, since various regulations have been enforced during
the past century. The License Cases, 5 How. 504 (U. S. 1847);
Cooley v. Board of Governors, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851); Sherlock
v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 (1876); Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 332 (1904);
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 14 (1937).
The principal formula used to sustain the state action in the
instant case was the local diversity rule, first advanced in the
Cooley case, supra. In addition to this, the Court discussed the
problem in terms of the nature and extent of the burden imposed
on interstate and foreign commerce, and the relative weight of the
state and national interests involved. Southern Pacific R. R. v.
Arizona, 325 U. S. 761 (1945).
This distinction of theories is probably unnecessary if the
decision in the Southern Pacific case, supra, is accepted. Weighing
the interests and determining the extent of the burden in fact
decides whether the particular regulation is sufficiently local to be
sustained or must fall because it disturbs the uniformity of com-
merce.
State regulations dealing with the race discrimination problem
in interstate commerce have been held unconstitutional as an undue
burden on commerce. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1877); Morgan
v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946). In the Hall case, the state regula-
tion in question prohibited discrimination, while in the Morgan
case, the regulation directed discrimination.
In the principal case, the Court distinguished the Hall case and
the Morgan case on the grounds that the state regulations involved
in those cases more directly affected the uniform flow of commerce
than did the highly localized application of the act in question.
Relying on the Hall case, defendant contended that states
should be precluded from applying civil rights regulations to inter-
state and foreign commerce, for if allowed to act, adjoining states
and countries could enforce antithetical statutes, and thus effect
an undue burden on carriers operating between them. The Court
19481
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dismissed the contention, declaring the possibility of future race
discrimination legislation to be too remote to be a present burden
on interstate or foreign commerce.
While the Hall case was not directly overruled, its soundness
has been severely questioned. The trend in the past decade has
been toward the protection of civil rights. See 41 STAT. 479 (1920),
49 U.S.C. § 3 (1) (1940); Ontario Session Laws c. 51 (1944). The
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will strike
down discriminatory practices. Morgan v. Virginia, supra. Thus,
state anti-discrimination regulations can be uniformly applied with
no resulting burden on commerce.
In light of the fact that the "heavy wheels of Congress" move
so slowly, it seems that national interest in civil rights can best be
served if states are allowed to regulate in this area.
Bryce W. Kendall
CORPORATIONS-LEGAL ENTITY-CONSTRUCTION OF COMMODITY
CLAUSE, INTERSTATECOMIERCE ACT
Suit by the United States against the Bethlehem Steel Corpora-
tion and its wholly owned subsidiaries, railroad and steel producing
companies, to enjoin their violation of the Commodities Clause of
the Interstate Commerce Act, which makes it unlawful for any
railroad to transport in interstate commerce any article produced
by it or under its authority, or in which it may have any interest,
direct or indirect. 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (8) (1940).
The railroad company transported the products of the steel com-
pany as well as the products of some twenty-seven other inde-
pendent shippers. Held, affirming dismissal of the suit by the United
States District Court, that neither ownership by the holding com-
pany of all the shares of stock in both the railroad company and the
steel company, nor power of control incident thereto, was sufficient,
standing alone, to show violation of the Commodities Clause of the
Interstate Commerce Act. United States v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.,
Bethlehem Co., and Bethlehem Steel Corp., 68 Sup. Ct. 868 (1948).
The Supreme Court based its decision on two grounds: (1) The
construction previously given the Commodities Clause was con-
trolling; (2) Reversal is not to be readily made of a previous statu-
tory construction when Congress has failed to amend the statute
after extensive committee consideration.
The Commodities Clause, as first construed by the Supreme
Court had most of its teeth drawn when it was held that it did
not prohibit a railroad company from carrying commodities manu-
factured, mined, produced or owned, etc., by a bona fide corpora-
tion in which the railroad company was a stockholder. United
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States v. Delaware & H. R. R., 213 U. S. 366 (1909); United States
v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 220 U. S. 257 (1911). This construction was
reiterated and accepted in later cases, although the companies were
found guilty of violating the act because the power of control ex-
istent in the relationship of a holding company, was exercised to the
extent that the subsidiaries were nothing more than departments or
agents of the parent organization. United States v. Delaware, L. &
W. R. R., 238 U. S. 516 (1915); United States v. Reading R. R., 253
U. S. 26 (1920); United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 254 U. S. 255
(1920). The result was consistent with the principle set forth in
United States v. Delaware & H. R. R., supra, that, "When sUch
ownership of stock is resorted to, not for the purpose of participat-
ing in the affairs of the corporation in which it is held, in a manner
normal and usual with stockholders, but for the purpose of making
it a mere agent or instrumentality or department of another com-
pany, the courts will look through the forms to the reality of the
relation between the companies as if the corporate agency did not
exist and will deal with them as the justice of the case may require."
Accord, Lukenback S. S. Co. v. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C.C.A.
4th 1920); Coston v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F. 2d 383 (C.C.A. 2d
1928).
The Government subsequently attempted to obtain a modifica-
tion of the accepted construction of the Commodities Clause by in-
sisting that although a railroad company may own shares of a pro-
ducing company and not come under the prohibition, that if a
holding company acquires all shares of both carrier and producer,
then such transportation becomes illegal, on the theory that the
subsidiaries are necessarily no more than the alter ego of the holding
company. The Court held that it is not the power, but the abuse
of the power that is forbidden by the clause. United States v. Elgin,
J. & E. R. R., 298 U. S. 492 (1936).
Courts have disregarded the corporate entity where there was
little or no evidence of control when necessary to enforce the policy
of the law. Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 574
(1915); United States v. Walter, 263 U. S. 15 (1923); Brundred v.
Rice, 49 Ohio St. 640, 32 N. E. 169 (1892).
Generally courts have been reluctant to disregard the corporate
entity in private litigation in torts. Friedman v. Vandalia R. R., 254
Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 8th. 1918); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N. Y. 84,
155 N. E. 58 (1926); Bergenthal v. State Garage & Trucking Co., 179
Wis. 42, 190 N. W. 901 (1922). This is also true in contracts. Majestic
Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, Inc., 21 F. 2d 720 (C. C. A. 8th. 1927);
Marsh v. Southern New England R. R., 230 Mass. 483, 120 N. E. 120
(1918).
The Court, in deciding the principal case, found less evidence of
1948]
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actual abuse of the power of control than was present in the Elgin
case, supra. The Government probably relied heavily on a reconsti-
tuted Court to reverse what was considered an erroneous decision
in the Elgin case, supra. Mr. Justice Jackson, in the majority opinion,
after intimating that the decision might not have been the same had
the question been before them in the first instance, pointed out that
Congress had considered the alleged mistake and had failed to
amend the act. A reversal is not readily to be made of a previous
statutory construction, not of constitutional import, in the face of
thorough Congressional consideration and failure to amend. Sessions
v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 29 (1892); Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving
Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320 (1934); Missouri v. Ross, 299 U. S. 72 (1936);
Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadger, 307 U.S. 5 (1939).
Mr. Justice Rutledge in the dissenting opinion found from a
review of the same legislative history a clear disagreement by the
Congressional committee with the Court's construction of the clause,
and contended that approval of such construction could not be in-
ferred from the failure of Congress to amend.
Whether there is any need for a more drastic application of the
clause is a question which, in light of the principal case, requires
Congressional determination.
George E. Taylor
DOMESTIC RELATIONS--SUPPORT PENDENTE LrrE IN A Civin ACTION
FOR MONEY ONLY
In Virginia in 1942 plaintiff obtained a divorce a vinculo from
defendant and was awarded custody of their minor child. The de-
cree was silent as to support and maintenance. Plaintiff and child
are now residents of Pennsylvania and defendant is a resident of
Ohio. Plaintiff, the mother, having supported the child since 1935,
brought a civil action in the Common Pleas Court of Summit
County, Ohio, for the reasonable value of the support and
maintenance already furnished by her for the child. The plaintiff
also filed a motion for an order requiring defendant to pay the plain-
tiff a sum of money for the temporary support and maintenance
of the child during the pendency of the action. The common pleas
court overruled the motion on the ground that there is no statutory
authority upon which to base such an order. Reversed by the court
of appeals. Held, (4-3) affirming the appellate court, that in a civil
suit against the father for the reasonable value of support and
maintenance furnished to his minor child the trial court has juris-
diction to entertain a motion for support and maintenance of the
child pendente lite. McDaniel v. Rucker, 150 Ohio St. 261, 80 N.E.
2d 849 (1948).
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Under the rule prevailing at American common law the father
is civilly liable for the support of his minor child. 4 VERNIER, AmER-
icAN FAmILY LAWS 56 (1936). In all but one of the 51 American
jurisdictions statutes exist affecting the parents' civil liabil-
ity for support of the child. Id. at 57. In Ohio the primary obli-
gation for support rests upon the father. Omo GEN. CODE § 7997
(1938); Kintner v. Kintner, 78 Ohio App. 324, 65 N.E. 2d 156 (1946).
In Ohio the obligation of the father to provide for the support of his
minor child is not impaired by a decree which divorces the wife a
vinculo on account of the husband's misconduct. Pretzinger v. Pret-
zinger, 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N.E. 471 (1887); Industrial Commission v.
Drake, 103 Ohio St. 628, 134 N.E. 465 (1921). This follows the
weight of authority. See Notes, 15 A. L. R. 569 (1921); 81 A. L. R.
888 (1932). An exception is made in Ohio when the divorce was
based on the aggressions of the wife in that she cannot recover from
th' fbr'er husband f6r nedessaries furnished °to their child in her
custody in the absence of proof of a promise in fact, by the forme4
husband. Fulton v. Fulton, 52 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E. 729 (1895). Tie
father's liability for past support of his minor child is based on an
implied-in-law promise to pay. Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, supra;
Laumeier v. Laumeier, 237 N. Y. 357, 143 N.E. 219 (1924) ; Porter v.
Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N. W. 295 (1890).
In the principal case the supreme court reasoned that the claim
for past support and the motion for support pendente lite are both
based upon the same implied contract, that since the trial court has
jurisdiction of the claim for past support it therefore has jurisdiction
to entertain the motion for support pendente lite. Quaere, are both
claims based upon-the same implied contract? When the parent
neglects his duty to support his child, any other person who sup-
plies such necessaries is deemed to have conferred a benefit on the
delinquent parent. It is for the benefit thus conferred that the law
raises an implied promise to pay on the part of the parent. Porter
v. Powell, supra. No holdings have been found which extend the
parent's liability to third persons on this implied-in-law contract to
cover benefits not already conferred. It would appear that since
support pendente lite is not a claim for benefits already conferred,
it is not based upon a contract implied in law.
-It is to be noted that a number of -American jurisdictions have
placed a broad, statutory duty on the parents to support their minor
children without making any provision for enforcement of the obli-
gation. While there is considerable variation in the extent to which
this duty is enforced, -the trend has been consistently in the direc-
tion of greater protection of the rights of the minor child. A fev
recent decisions have permitted an action for support to be brought
by the minor child, appearing through next friend. Green v. Green,
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210 N.C. 147, 185 S.E. 651 (1936); Pickelsimer v. Critcher, 210 N.C.
779, 188 S.E. 313 (1936); Simonds v. Simonds, 154 F. 2d 326 (1946).
One court, finding the minor child to be responsible and living apart
from either parent, ordered the support payments to be made di-
rectly to the child. Simonds v. Simonds, supra.
Assuming support pendente lite not to be based upon a contract
implied in law, it would appear that the same socially desirable
result could be logically reached by the exercise of equity juris-
diction on the ground that the law remedy is inadequate.
Howard Crown
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-INFANCY-EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DISAFFIRM
CONTRACTS AT MATURITY
Defendant, nineteen years of age, jointly with his father and
mother executed a cognovit note payable to plaintiff's uncle. Consid-
eration for the note was money previously loaned to the father.
Six years later, the plaintiff obtained a confession of judgment on
the note. Judgment became dormant and plaintiff had the judg-
ment revived. Thereafter, father and son filed petitions to vacate
the judgment. Judgment was entered against the father and in
favor of the son and plaintiff appealed. Held, judgment affirmed.
Cassella v. Tiberio, 150 Ohio St. 27, 80 N.E. 2d 426 (1948).
The court held that the cognovit note was executory as to the
promisors, and where an infant signs the note purely as an ac-
comodation, without receiving any benefit from the transaction, he
need not disaffirm the contract within a reasonable time after at-
taining majority to escape liability. The court would not apply this
rule to an executory contract under which an infant had received
and retained something of value. In such an instance, the infant
would be bound if he did nothing by way of disaffirmance within
a reasonable time after attaining majority. This latter rule would
also apply where the contract had been fully executed.
The liability of an infant in such a situation had not been di-
rectly decided in any previous decision. It had been stated that an
infant's contract was voidable at the election of the infant and
could be disaffirmed by him upon reaching his majority or within
a reasonable time thereafter. Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co., 119 Ohio
St. 575, 163 N.E. 93 (1929). In the Elf case, supra, an infant, repre-
senting himself to be of full age, purchased an automobile. After
reaching majority, he sought to disaffirm the contract and recover
the money paid. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, but the
defendant was permitted to counterclaim for and recover damages
for the use and abuse of the car while in the possession of the in-
fant. Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18 (1927). But where
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an infant had given a note for the balance of the purchase price
of an automobile it was held that he could disaffirm within a rea-
sonable time after reaching majority. Hoffman v. Edson, 37 Ohio
App. 262, 173 N.E. 307 (1929). Neither court made any distinction
between an infant's executory or executed contract. In both cases,
the contract had been executed by the promisee, but the infant's
promise to pay was executory. Using the classification in the prin-
cipal case, these would be contracts, executory as to the infant,
but under which he had received something of value. A recent
court of appeals case held that the defendant was not entitled to
disaffirm a note where for ten years after he attained his majority,
he remained mute as to disaffirmance. McKenzie v. Tellis, 37 Ohio
L. Abs. 351, 47 N.E. 2d 253 (App. 1942).
Several of the cases cited in the principal case support the
broad proposition that an infant is not bound by an executory con-
tract unless he affirms or ratifies it after he reaches his majority.
Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Snyder, 78 Minn. 502, 81 N.W. 516 (1900);
Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148 (1872); Tyler v. Estate of Gallop,
68 Mich. 185, 35 N.W. 902 (1888).
Other cases cited distinguish contracts under which the infant
receives some benefit from those under which he has received no
benefit. In the latter case, he is not liable on the contract unless
he ratifies it after he reaches majority. Pierce Co. v. Wallace, 251
Mass. 383, 146 N.E. 658 (1925) (minor became a surety upon a recog-
nizance in a poor debtor proceeding); Walker v. Stokes Bros. & Co.,
262 S.W. 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (minor had signed a note as ac-
comodation surety for his adult brother). Where defendant had in-
herited bank stock as a minor and a receiver sought to recover the
double liability imposed upon stockholders by the constitution, the
defendant was not held liable notwithstanding the fact that he had
retained the stock for more than five years after majority and had
not disaffirmed. The court held that the bank stock was without
value and known to be worthless. The defendant had not received
any benefit and not having ratified the contract after his arrival at
majority, he was not bound by it. Brownell v. Adams, 121 Neb. 304,
236 N.W. 750 (1931). The contracts in the Walker case, supra, and
the Wallace case, supra, were executory, but in the Brownell case,
supra, the infant's contractual relationship had been fully executed.
The syllabus by the court in the principal case would not support
the holding in the latter case.
In permitting the infant to disaffirm, the court cited Lanning v.
Brown, 84 Ohio St. 385, 95 N.E. 921 (1911) which held that where a
grantor has not ratified a conveyance of land made during infancy,
he may disaffirm at any time before an action of ejectment is barred
by the Statute of Limitations. A conveyance of real estate is an
1948)
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executed contract. Robinson v. Fife, 3 Ohio St. 551 (1854) ; McGinnis
v. Less, 147 Ark. 211, 227 S.W. 398 (1921). Applying the rules set
forth in the principal case, such a contract would have to be avoided
by the infant within a reasonable time after reaching majority or
he would be bound by it. This would overrule a case which the
court used to support its finding.
The court was not content to rest its judgment on the fact that
the contract was executory, but looked to the position of the parties
with reference to the subject matter of the contract. To base the
classification of the contracts upon the effect which mere nonaction
by the minor has upon the respective rights or interests of the
parties, rather than upon the arbitrary test of whether the contract
be regarded as executed or executory, seems to be in better accord
with reason and sound principle. Walker v. Stokes Bros. & Co.,
supra.
The common law was apprehensive for the welfare of minors
and clothed them with extensive privileges in their contractual re-
lationships. Under modem commercial conditions, some courts
have felt that the business community now requires protection
against the unrestrained exercise by minors of their legal. privilege.
See Sternlieb v. Normandie National Security Corporation, 263 N.Y.
245, 188 N.E. 726 (1934).
Several states have enacted statutes dealing with infants' con-
tracts. Iowa Code Section 599.2 (1946) provides that "a minor is
bound not only by contracts for necessaries, but also by his other
contracts, unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable time after
he attains his majority. . . ." For an excellent report on the statutes
of the several states, see Report of the Law Revision Commission
of the State of New York (1938).
Even though the defendant in the principal case was permitted
to avoid liability after he had remained passive for more than nine
years after reaching majority, the general tenor of the opinion is
to the effect that an infant will not be able to exercise his privilege
of avoidance, if he accepts any rights under the contract, for more
than a reasonable time after reaching majority. In subsequent de-
cisions the oft-quoted maxim that "infancy is a shield and not a
sword" may become more than an idle reproach.
Ralph N. Mahaffey
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MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RECALL PROVISIONS
OF HOME RULE CHARTER
In a mandamus proceeding the relator sought to compel the
Hamilton city clerk to deliver to relator recall petition forms nec-
essary to initiate a recall election of a city council member under
Hamilton's charter provision which provides that the term of office
shall be two years unless under the provisions of the charter a
councilman is recalled by a majority vote of the electors. Respond-
ent contended that the recall provisions violated Article II, Section
38 of the Ohio Constitution which reads, "Laws shall be passed pro-
viding for the prompt removal from office, upon complaint and
hearing, of all officers.., for any misconduct involving moral turpi-
tude or for other cause provided by law. . . ." Held, respondent's
demurrer to the petition overruled and a writ of mandamus issued.
State ex rel. Hackler v. Edmonds, 150 Ohio St. 203, 80 N. E. 2d 769
(1948).
The charter in question was adopted pursuant to Article XVIII,
Section 7 of the Constitution which provides that, "Any municipal-
ity may ... adopt a charter for its government and may, subject to
the provisions of section three of this article, exercise thereunder
all powers of local self-government." Section 3 reads, "Municipali-
ties shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-govern-
ment and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws."
The debates and proceedings of the Ohio Constitutional Con-
vention of 1912 indicate that the purpose of the home-rule amend-
ments was to give to municipalities the broadest possible powers of
self-government in connection with all matters which are strictly
local and do not impinge upon matters which are of state-wide
nature or interest. Article XVIII was intended to secure home rule
to municipalities, State ex rel. Bailey v. George, 92 Ohio St. 344,
110 N.E. 951 (1915) and the provisions of a city charter in all mat-
ters of self-government are paramount to general laws. State ex
rel. Sparks v. Kroeger, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 197 (App. 1933). The selec-
tion of municipal officers is a matter of purely local concern, and
the method of their selection and the tenure of their office may
legally be limited or circumscribed by the provisions of a municipal
charter. State ex rel. Frankenstein v. Hillenbrand, 100 Ohio St.
339, 126 N.E. 309 (1929); State ex rel. Taylor v. French, 96 Ohio St.
172, 117 N.E. 173 (1919); Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338,
103 N.E. 512 (1913).
Ohio General Code Section 2713 (1937) providing for removal
of justices of the peace, county, and township officers as prescribed
by law, was automatically repealed by Article II, Section 38 of the
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constitution. State ex rel. Hoel v. Brown, 105 Ohio St. 479, 138 N.E.
230 (1922). The present court approved the Brown case, supra, but
pointed out that the decision is not applicable to a recall provision
in a city charter adopted pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 7.
A municipal code provision for recall was declared unconstitu-
tional in a recent court of appeals case on the theory that Article
II, Section 38, applies to municipal officers and exacts the procedure
of complaint and hearing in all cases. State ex rel. Burnett v. Ducy,
36 Ohio L. Abs. 467, 44 N.E. 2d 803 (App. 1942). The soundness of
the court of appeals' interpretation. was questioned as an original
proposition by Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory
and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L. J. 18 (1948) where it was pointed out
that the recall is a political process, which may be employed with-
out relation to grounds for removal in any ordinary legal sense,
whereas Article H, Section 38 is addressed to removal for cause.
The principal case may be distinguished from the Ducy case, supra,
in that here a recall provision of a home-rule charter was under
consideration, but such a distinction is of doubtful validity in view
of the fact that substantive home-rule powers are granted to all
municipalities. OHIO CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3. Rather the present
case would seem to be but a reaffirmance of the right to home rule
by municipalities where the exercise of that right is not inconsistent
with general laws of the state.
Lowell B. Howard
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs-NoNEXISTENT CORPORATE PAYEF.-
INDORSEMENT
Plaintiff contracted with persons representing themselves as of-
ficers of the Lowell Cartridge Corporation for the delivery of a
quantity of cartridges. Plaintiff gave the "officers" a check for
$5,000 payable to the Lowell Cartridge Corporation. The check was
deposited without indorsement in Irving Trust Co., impleaded de-
fendant, to the account of the corporation. When the check was
presented to Manufacturers Trust Co., defendant bank, the bank of
deposit guaranteed all prior indorsements. Manufacturers Trust
Co. paid the check and charged the $5,000 to plaintiff's account. The
corporation did not come into existence until after the "officers"
had drawn out the $5,000 for their personal use. Plaintiff had no
knowledge of the nonexistence until suit was brought against the
corporation for breach of contract, fraud and conspiracy, which re-
sulted in an unsatisfied default judgment. Plaintiff now sues Manu-
facturers Trust Co. for charging its account with the $5,000. Held,
judgment for plaintiff against Manufacturers Trust Co. and for
Manufacturers against Irving Trust Co. International Aircraft Trad-
ing Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 79 N.E. 2d 249 (N. Y. 1948).
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The trial court denied recovery on the basis of the imposter rule
-the rule that has as its consequence the imposition of liability on
the drawer, when the check is drawn to a third person but paid to
the person intended by the drawer. BRmIToN, BnLs AND NoTEs § 151
(1943). The upper court differed with the trial court upon the ap-
plication of the rule to the facts presented and in view of precedent
arrived at what seems to be a correct determination of plaintiff's in-
tention. Strang v. Westchester County National Bank, 235 N. Y. 68,
138 N. E. 739 (1923).
Some courts have looked beyond the intention of the drawer
and placed liability on the drawee for paying on a forged instru-
ment. However, there can be no forgery under Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law Section 23, when the party intended as payee by
the maker, indorsed as the payee designated on the check. Omo
GEN. CODE § 8128 (1938); 11 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 89, 92 (1937); Mc-
Henry v. Old Citizens Nat. Bank, 85 Ohio St. 203, 97 N. E. 395 (1911).
There is a distinction between the case where the drawer de-
livers a check to the imposter thinking he is the person named as
payee and the case where the imposter represents himself as the
agent of the payee. Strang v. Westchester County National Bank,
supra. When dealing with the typical imposter-agent situation it
appears that the Ohio court would reach the same conclusion as that
reached by the court in the principal case. Armstrong v. Pomeroy
Nat. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512, 22 N.E. 866 (1889); J. F. Jones' Sons v.
Peoples Bank Co., 23 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 353 (C. P. 1913).
The court, in Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 135, 19
N. E. 2d 992 (1939), in construing Illinois law applicable to a check
made out to a nonexistent person, stated as dictum, "If construed in
accordance with New York law, it constituted an order to pay to a
nonexistent person; it was a check without a payee to whom it could
be delivered, who could transfer it or who could demand or receive
payment. Such a check is a mere scrap of paper creating neither
right nor obligation." Of this the court in the principal case said,
"On that reasoning, it follows that the check in issue was a legal
nullity, not entitled to be honored, and that Manufacturers is liable
for charging it against plaintiff's account." Quaere, whether the
court gave much weight to this statement. By a strict application
of the dictum in Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., supra, there could
be no application of the imposter rule to a nonexistent payee and
the law is too well settled on this point to be so easily overthrown.
Strang v. Westchester County National Bank, supra.
Even though the court in the principal case stated it need not
consider whether a nonexistent corporate payee ever has a place
within the scope of the imposter rule, the decision may have an im-
pact on the law of the other states and produce the result that the
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court may never consider the imposter rule when such a payee is
involved.
The result reached by the court in the principal case would
seem appropriate but it would appear that liability could have been
imposed on still another ground. Since the check in issue carried no
indorsement by the imposter-agent it could be argued that the check
was not negotiated so as to constitute the transferee the holder
thereof.
"An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one
person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee the
holder thereof. If payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery;
if payable to order it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder
completed by delivery." UmNFo~m NEGOTIABLE INSTRUNT LAW
§ 30; OHIO GEN. CODE § 8135 (1938). There are three situations
wherein an order instrument may be transferred without indorse-
ment: (1) when construed to be a bearer instrument; (2) when ex-
pressly assigned; and (3) when impliedly assigned. "The instru-
ment is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fic-
titious or nonexistent person, and such fact was known to the per-
son making it so payable." UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUIMENTS LAW
§ 9 (3); OHmO GEN. CODE § 8114 (1938). The check in the principal
case, and in the usual imposter situation, cannot come within this
provision since the drawer does not know of the nonexistence.
The second exception to the general rule that an order instrument
cannot be transferred without an indorsement is in the case of an
express assignment. An assignment written on the instrument, or
on a separate instrument, attached or unattached, is deemed to be
an indorsement. In re Stockham, 193 Iowa 823, 186 N.W. 650
(1922); Crosby v. Roub, 16 Wis. 616 (1863); O'Gasapian v. Danielson,
284 Mass. 27, 187 N. E. 107 (1933); Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184,
66 N.W. 493 (1895). The facts of the principal case reveal no such
written instrument.
The third exception is that of an implied assignment. UNI-
pOEaa NEGOTIABLE INsTRulwIENTs LAW § 49; OIo GEN. CODE § 8154
(1938). This section provides, "Where the holder of an instrument
payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it
...." It is apparent that the above provision is not applicable to
the situation, as here, where someone other than the named payee
transfers the instrument. Considering that it is such a normal and
regular procedure to deposit checks without indorsement that many
banks have a special rubber stamp for just such an occasion, the
facts of the principal case, as they must have appeared to the Irving
Trust Co., present such a deviation from the norm that it can hardly
be considered a regular transaction.
Approaching the case through the lack of indorsement makes
[Vol. 9
RECENT DECISIONS
unnecessary the determination of the drawer's intentions-a diffi-
cult task at best as indicated by the disagreement between the trial
court and the upper court in the case at bar.
David W. Hart
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTs-BuRDEN OF PROOF OF CONSIDERATION
The probate court ordered the sale of certain shares of stock
in decedent's estate. Thereafter, the plaintiff corporation filed appli-
cation for the determination of the validity of a lien on the shares,
alleging that they had been pledged as collateral on decedent's
unpaid note. The estate asserted that the pledge failed because
there had been no consideration for the note. The probate court
found the lien invalid and the corporation appealed on questions of
law and fact. Held, the lien was rightly denied since the company
failed to sustain its burden of proof of consideration. In re Estate
of Kennedy, 82 Ohio App. 359, 80 N.E. 2d 810 (1948).
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act there was a conflict of authority as to the burden of proof of
consideration for a negotiable instrument in the hands of a party
not a holder in due course. Probably a majority of courts placed the
ultimate burden or "risk of non-persuasion" on the party relying
on the instrument. Farmers' Loan Co. v. Siefke, 144 N.Y. 354, 39
N.E. 358 (1895); Conmey v. MacFarlane, 97 Pa. 361 (1881); WILLIs-
TON, CONTRACTS §§ 108, 1147 (Rev. ed. 1936); See Notes, 35 A.L.R.
1370 (1925), 65 A.L.R. 904 (1930). The introduction of the N.I.L.
required the interpretation of at least two sections affecting the
problem. Section 24, "Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima
facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration. . . ." OHIO
GEN. CODE § 8129 (1938). Section 28, "Absence or failure of consider-
ation is a matter of defense as against any person not a holder in
due- course.... ." OHIo GEN. CODE § 8133 (1938). Under these pro-
visions a majority of courts have concluded that the legislature in-
tended to place the burden of proof on the party asserting the lack
of consideration. Kessler v. Valerio, 102 Conn. 620, 129 Atl. 788
(1925); Conforti Construction Co. v. Neek Realty Corp., 125 Misc.
876, 212 N.Y. Supp. 393 (Sup. Ct. 1925); BRAuNAN, NEGOTIABLE IN-
STmUMTS LAW § 24 (6th ed. Buetel, 1938); BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES § 99 (1943).
Seven years after Ohio's adoption of the Act, but without men-
tion of it, the Supreme Court of Ohio placed the burden of proof of
consideration on the party setting forth the instrument. Ginn v.
Dolan, 81 Ohio St. 121, 90 N. E. 141 (1909). Several lower courts
have followed the Ginn case, supra, in their interpretation of the
statute. Sharick v. Szefcyk, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 332 (App. 1934); Schardt
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v. Schardt, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 185 (App. 1934); Bates v. McDowell, 5
Ohio L. Abs. 246 (App. 1927); Woodbury v. Bollmeyer, 20 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 113, 31 Ohio C.D. 157 (1912).
While Section 28 of the N.I.L. specifically provides for both ab-
sence and failure of consideration, some Ohio courts, using dictum
in the Ginn case, supra, have shifted the burden of proof of failure
of consideration to the party asserting such failure. Walters v.
Smith, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 499 (App. 1929); Bear v. Bear, 29 Ohio App.
272, 162 N.E. 711 (1928); Maher v. Collection Co., 1 Ohio L. Abs. 297
(App. 1923); Klein & Heffelman Co. v. Peterman, 6 Ohio App. 145
(1916).
Two courts have said that the instrument involved in the Ginn
case, supra, was executed prior to the adoption of the N.I.L. and was
therefore not subject to the statute. The courts then adopted the
majority rule of placing the burden of proof on the party attacking
the consideration. Darby v. Chambers, 70 Ohio App. 287, 46 N.E. 2d
302 (1942); Miller Rubber Products Co. v. Noll, 30 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
305 (1933).
Assuming that the facts of the Ginn case, supra, make the N.I.L.
inapplicable, it should now be possible for Ohio to adopt the major-
ity rule and place the burden of proof on the party claiming the lack
of consideration. It would seem that this rule could have been ap-
plied in the principal case even though the question arose in the
probate court rather than the usual contest between the maker and
a person not a holder in due course.
Lloyd E. Fisher, Jr.
PLEADING--CLASS SuITs-FUNCTION OF DEMURRER-RIGHT TO FILE AN
AMENDED PETITION
Plaintiff on behalf of 600,000 gas consumers brought a repre-
sentative suit against defendants, gas and electric corporations, in
which he alleged their secret dilution of gas distributed and sought
injunctive relief and damages. A demurrer to the petition was sus-
tained and plaintiff's motion to amend was overruled. Held, judg-
ment reversed with instruction to permit the filing of an amended
petition and to overrule a general demurrer if filed thereto. Davies
v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 79 N.E. 2d 327 (Ohio App. 1948).
Although the original purpose of a demurrer was to terminate
the case when a decision on the issue of law raised was rendered,
it has long been true, even under common-law pleading, that
amendment over after demurrer sustained is freely allowed. CLARK,
CODE PLEADING 527 (1927). But see SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEAD-
ING 287 (3d ed. Ballantine, 1923).
Ohio General Code Section 11365 permits such amendment as
follows, "If the demurrer be sustained, the adverse party may amend
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if the defect can be remedied... ." Amendment is allowed not
as a matter of right but it rests in the trial court's sound discretion.
Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Keys, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 76, 85 (App.
1932); Angelis v. Foster, 75 P. 2d 650 (Cal. App. 1938). However it
has been held a clear abuse of discretion to refuse such amendment.
Buckeye Garage Co. v. Caldwell, 18 Ohio .C. C. (N.S.) 429, 432
(1910); that a court is rarely justified in refusing leave to amend,
Hanna v. Hershhorn, 112 Cal. App. 438, 296 Pac. 891 (1931); that it
is not a matter of discretion with the court but a positive duty,
Euster v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 139 Pa. Super. 6, 10 A. 2d 877 (1940);
that the court must permit an amendment, Becraft v. Wright, 113
S.W. 2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); that denial of leave to amend con-
stituted abuse of discretion regardless of whether leave to amend
was requested, unless complaint showed on its face that it was in-
capable of amendment, King v. Mortimer, 188 P. 2d 502 (Cal. App.
1948) ; that court must give plaintiff opportunity to amend unless it is
clear that the error cannot be cured, Seitz v. Fulton National Bank
of Lancaster, 325 Pa. 14, 188 Atl. 569 (1936) ; Provo City v. Claudin,
91 Utah 60, 63 P. 2d 570 (1936).
Further, it is generally held that upon repleading by either
party, issue is taken upon the new pleadings onlyr, and the former
pleading is not in issue. Collins v. Streitz, 47 Ariz. 146, 54 P. 2d 264
(1936); Grubbs v. Smith, 86 F. 2d 275 (C.C.A. 6th 1936), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 658 (1937); Wright v. Risser, 290 Ill. A1pp. 576, 8 N.E. 2d 966
(1937); Ericson v. Slomer, 94 F. 2d 437 (C.C.A. 7th 1938); Walraven
v. Walraven, 47 S.E. 2d 148 (Ga. App. 1948); Cauble v. Boy Scouts
of America, 250 Ala. 152, 33 So. 2d 461 (1948) ; CLARK, CODE PLEADING
528 (1927). It is clear in Ohio that this is the rule once plaintiff has
ified his amended petition. Grimm v. Modest, 135 Ohio St. 275, 20
N.E. 2d 527 (1939); State v. Moreland, 132 Ohio St. 71, 5 N.E. 2d 159
(1936); Bingham v. Nypano R.R., 112 Ohio St. 115, 147 N.E. 1 (1925);
Smith v. Ward, 32 Ohio App. 177, 166 N.E. 396 (1929).
It is also the rule where leave was granted to file, but the filing
in fact never took place. Coral Gables, Inc., v. Garn, 23 Ohio L. Abs.
162 (App. 1936) ; Berry v. Barton, 12 Okla. 221, 224, 71 Pac. 1074, 1075
(1902).
The principal case goes even further in holding that when a
party moves for leave to file an amended petition, although it is
denied, the intention to abandon the original petition remains, pro-
hibiting a claim of error when the court sustains a demurrer to the
original petition. Accord, Anthony v. Slayden, 27 Colo. 144, 60 Pac.
826,828 (1900).
The class action, or representative suit, has caused a great deal
of confusion in the law and there is no outstanding weight of au-
thority as to the proper interpretation of the code provisions of the
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various states which permit the bringing of such an action. Wheaton,
Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 CoRN. L. Q.
399,433 (1933).
Ohio General Code Section 11257 provides, "When the question
is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or the
parties are very numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of
all." See Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MnN. L. REv.
34 (1937); Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in Code Pro-
vision for Representative Suits, 30 MICH. L. REV. 878 (1932).
It is generally held that this and similar statutes apply to both
legal and equitable causes. Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 730, 36 N.E.
735 (1893); Cherry v. Howell, 4 F. Supp. 597 (E. D. N. Y. 1933) (but
not fraud or deceit); Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N.E. 335
(1932); Walker v. Village of Dillonvale, 82 Ohio St. 137, 92 N.E. 220
(1910). Contra: Baskins v. U.M.W.A., 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464
(1921); 24 MiNN. L. REv. 703 (1940).
Some go further, as in the principal case, and hold that the
statute applies to all cases, i.e. law or equity, contract or tort. Jack-
son v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 211 S.W. 2d 138
(Ky. App. 1948); Wheaton, supra at 431; or that the "interest" re-
quired is a "common" interest as opposed to a "united" interest.
Day v. Buckingham, 87 Wis. 215, 58 N.W. 254 (1894) ; George v. Ben-
jamin, 100 Wis. 622, 76 N.W. 619 (1898).
Although not required so to decide, the court in the principal
case hinted that should the occasion arise, they would interpret the
statute in the "disjunctive sense" and permit a class action when
there was either a question of common or general interest or when
the parties were very numerous. Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147
Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946); Haggerty v. Squire, 137 Ohio St.
207, 220, 28 N.E. 2d 554, 560 (1940); Smith v. Kroeger, 138 Ohio St.
508, 37 N.E. 2d 45 (1941); McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 Barb. 516
(N.Y. 1851) ; Hilton Bridge Const. Co. v. Foster, 26 Misc. 338, 57 N. Y.
Supp. 140 (Sup. Ct. 1899), affd, 42 App. Div. 630, 59 N.Y. Supp. 1106
(3d Dep't 1899). But see Garfein v. Steglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86 S.W. 2d
155 (1935) ; Wheaton, supra at 434; Lesar, supra at 36.
Another interesting pronouncement by the court in the instant
case was that a class suit may be maintained if claims in the ag-
gregate exceed the jurisdictional minimum even though individual
claims are less than the jurisdictional amount. Commonwealth v.
Scott, 112 Ky. 252, 65 S.W. 596 (1901); Gorley v. Louisville, 23 Ky.
L. Rep. 1782, 65 S.W. 844 (App. 1901).
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This Ohio Court of Appeals has taken the modern liberal view
on the points involved but it must remain for the Ohio Supreme
Court to stamp its approval on the decision before it can be termed
the law.
Norman W. Shibley
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-QUALIFIED MOTION FOR DIREcTEDn VERDICT
Plaintiff corporation sued defendant in the Municipal Court of
Cincinnati for the balance of the purchase price on merchandise
delivered to defendant. On trial two questions of fact were pre-
sented. At the close of all the evidence, plaintiff moved for an
instructed verdict. Before the court ruled on plaintiff's motion,
defendant made a like motion with the condition that, if overruled,
the defendant should have the right to have the issue of fact sub-
mitted to the jury. The trial court refused to accept and rule on
defendant's motion, and instructed a verdict for the plaintiff. Held,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. The trial court was in
error (1) in granting plaintiff's motion, and (2) in refusing to per-
mit the defendant to interpose the qualified motion. Steelmaterials
Corp. v. Stern, 82 Ohio App. 89, 77 N.E. 2d 272 (1947).
If both parties ask for a directed verdict and neither says or
does anything further, the courts indulge a rebuttable presumption
that the parties intend to waive submission to a jury and to consent
to trial by the court of questions of fact. This is the established
rule in Ohio. First National Bank v. Hayes & Sons, 64 Ohio St. 100,
59 N.E. 893 (1901). It is also the majority view. See Notes, 18
A.L.R. 1433 (1922); 108 A.L.R. 1315 (1937).
The presumption is overcome if either party makes a timely
request to go to the jury. Perkins v. Putnam, 88 Ohio St. 495, 103
N.E. 377 (1913); Eastern Dist. Piece Dye Works, Inc. v. Travelers'
Ins. Co., 234 N.Y. 441, 138 N.E. 401 (1923) ; Koehler v. Adler, 78 N.Y.
287 (1879), afd, 91 N.Y. 657 (1883). The motion and the request
need not be made at the same time. Kramer v. Rath, 42 Ohio App.
1, 181 N.E. 277 (1932); Need v. Hershman, 103 Ohio St. 12, 132 N.E.
19 (1921).
In the principal case, defendant qualified his motion in order to
avoid submission of the case to the court. It had been indicated in
previous supreme court cases that a party may properly make a
motion thus qualified. Buckeye State Building & Loan v. Schmidt,
131 Ohio St. 132, 2 N.E. 2d 264 (1936); Levick v. Bonnell, 137 Ohio
St. 453, 30 N.E. 2d 808 (1940). However, in the instant case, the court
of appeals ruled directly on the point, stating, "The trial court was
in error in refusing to accept the motion of the defendant for an
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instructed verdict, because it was accompanied with the reservation
of a right to go to the jury, if overruled." Supra, page 91, 77 N.E.
2d at 273.
The court resolved any doubt about this rule by its unequivocal
statement of a litigant's rights under a qualified motion.
Etta Melton Mitchell
SALES-TRUST RECEIPTS-BANKRUPTCY-BILL OF SALE CONSTRUED
AS CHATTEL MORTGAGE UNDER UNIFORM ACT
A bank made advances to a partnership dealing in home fur-
nishings. These advances were secured by trust receipts given to
the bank by the partners. In each transaction the partners gave the
bank a bill of sale covering certain merchandise which had been
previously purchased from third parties and which was in partners'
possession. The partners then signed a trust receipt acknowledging
receipt from the bank of the described merchandise and agreeing
to hold it as trustee for the bank. The partnership subsequently
was adjudged bankrupt. The trustee in bankruptcy contended that
the bills of sale given by the bankrupt were in reality unrecorded
chattel mortgages and therefore title passed to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy under Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 110c
(1937). Held, the bills of sale should be construed as chattel mort-
gages since the transactions between the bankrupt and the bank
were not transactions in the acquisition of new goods, but were
attempts to give security to the bank for goods previously acquired
by the bankrupt. In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573 (D. Ore. 1948).
Generally the tripartite trust receipt transaction is one which
involves a distant seller, a banker, and a local dealer or manufac-
turer. The distant seller, unable to finance the transaction as a
conditional sale, after receiving advances from the banker, conveys
the security interest to the banker and the beneficial ownership to
the dealer who has, before delivery of the goods, executed a trust
receipt to the banker.
This decision is in conformity with Section 2 of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, adopted by the Oregon legislature. Ohio has
not adopted the Uniform Act and there is doubt whether such trans-
actions will be recognized by the Ohio courts. The trust receipt
method of financing was recognized by the seaboard commercial
states as early as 1878. Farmers and Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Lynch,
74 N.Y. 568 (1878). During the early development of the trust
receipt, it was generally used in the financing of imported goods, but
by 1900 it was used extensively in domestic transactions.
In 1917 a Cincinnati manufacturer executed a trust receipt to
his financier. The goods which were to be used in the manufac-
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turer's business were then shipped from a vendor in Italy to the
financier and by him delivered to the manufacturer. It was held
that if the transaction did not disclose all of the elements of a con-
ditional sale, it was at least so far in the nature of a conditional sale
as to fall within the terms of the Ohio Conditional Sales Act. The
trust receipt failed because it had not been recorded according to
the provisions of the Conditional Sales Act. In re Bettman-Johnson
Co., 250 Fed. 657 (C.C.A. 6th 1918). The court found the trust re-
ceipt transaction analogous to a conditional sale notwithstanding
the fact that a trust receipt is used where the financier, who is
definitely not a vendor or seller, finances the transaction.
The Ohio statute on conditional sales was amended in 1925 and
now reads, "Provided, however, that neither the foregoing pro-
visions of this section nor sections 8560 and 8561 ... shall be con-
strued to apply to or to require the deposit, filing, or other record
whatsoever, of trust receipts or similar instruments executed and
delivered by any person, firm or corporation. Either (a) for the
goods or merchandise imported from without the United States...
or, (b) for a readily marketable staple wherever purchased. .. ."
Oino GEN. CODE § 8568 (1938). The statute then continues to provide
for the recording of a general agreement between the financier and
the dealer to finance transactions via trust receipts and eliminates
the recording of the individual trust receipt. This recording con-
stitutes constructive notice to third party creditors of the dealer.
Without the aid of a court's interpretation, it would appear from
the reading of Section 8568 that trust receipts would be a valid
method of financing in Ohio. However, this conclusion has been
repudiated by the courts' consistent refusal to recognize trust re-
ceipts and holding that such transactions are conditional sales.
A federal court found the legislative intent not to include auto-
mobiles as "readily marketable staples". Central Acceptance Corp.
'v. Lynch, 58 F. 2d 915 (C.C.A. 6th 1932). If automobiles are not
"readily marketable staples" (and therefore not a valid object for
trust receipt financing), a large segment of commercial financing
is restricted to chattel-mortgage and conditional-sale financing.
In spite of the decision in the Lynch case, supra, automobile
dealers and finance companies continue to use trust receipts. The
car manufacturer would ship cars to the finance company, which
would then deliver the cars to the dealer after receiving a properly
executed trust receipt, recorded in accordance with the provisions
of Section 8568 concerning conditional sales. Such a transaction
came before the court in 1934 in a proceeding between the finance
company and the dealer's trustee in bankruptcy. The court treated
the transaction as a conditional sale, citing In re Bettman-Johnson
Co., supra, and Central Acceptance Corp. v. Lynch, supra. In re
Collingwood Motor Sales, 72 F. 2d 137 (C.C.A. 6th 1934).
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A trust receipt is well adapted when the seller can not act as
financier and the dealer must give more security than a chattel
mortgage. The characteristics of trust-receipt transactions under
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act are the following: (1) the financier
is given extensive powers over the security interest. UNIFORM TRUST
RECEIPTS ACT §§ 6 (1), 6 (2), 10. (2) The financier is "not . . .
responsible as principal or vendor under any sale or contract to
sell made by the trustee." UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 12. (3)
Individual transactions for which the trust receipts are given need
not be recorded. The only recording necessary is the agreement
between the financier and the dealer to finance via trust receipts.
UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 13.
Since the courts have so restricted the use of the trust receipts
under the present statute, full consideration should be given to the
adoption of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in Ohio.
Jack W. Tracy
SURETY-GUARDIANSHIP-PREmiUm RATE UNDER IMPOUNDING
STATUTE
A guardian secured the impounding of his ward's securities in
the bank where they were deposited at the time of the creation of
the guardianship. He then applied to the probate court to fix a rea-
sonable sum to be paid a corporate surety as bond premium under
the provisions of Ohio General Code Section 9572 (1938), which pro-
vides for a maximum premium rate of one-fourth of one percent per
annum where the bond is in double the liability of the fiduciary. The
corporate surety contended that since the value of the deposited
securities was not included in fixing the amount of the bond, the
bond was not in double the amount of the liability of the fiduciary
as required by that section. Thus the surety argued that the pre-
mium should be at the higher rate of one-half of one percent per
annum. Held, the fiduciary was not liable for the impounded secur-
ities and since the bond which had been obtained was double the
amount of the remaining portion of the ward's estate the premium
should be at the lower rate of one-fourth of one percent per annum.
In re Estate of Brown, 51 Ohio L. Abs. 129, 79 N.E. 2d 340 (P. Ct.
1948).
The statutory authorization for the impounding of securities is
limited to an estate the value of which is so great "that the probate
court deems it inexpedient to require security in the full amount
required by law." OHIo Gm. CODE § 10506-23 (1938). The bond is
then fixed with respect to the remainder of the estate only. OHIO
GEN. CODE § 10506-24 (1938).
No fiduciary may take possession of assets until his letters of
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appointment have been issued, Omio GEN. CODE § 10506-2 (1938), and
no letters may be issued until the fiduciary has filed a penal bond
in double the probable value of the estate. Omio GEmN. CODE § 10506-4
(1938). In the principal case the fiduciary applied to the court to
fix the premium before his letters of appointment had been issued
and at no time were the impounded securities under his control.
The court concluded that no fiduciary should be held liable for prop-
erty which never reached his possession. The court met the prob-
lem of the fiduciary's handling the impounded securities in the
course of final disposition by stating that the depository held them
subject to the order of the court and subsequent orders could be
framed so as to prevent the fiduciary from coming into possession
or control.
Further legislative expression of approval of impounding assets
is seen in the section providing for the deposit of works of art with
a corporation conducting a museum if that corporation has a net
worth of at least ten times the value of the works so to be deposited.
Omo GEN. CODE § 10506-25a (1938).
The codes of Pennsylvania, Kentucky, West Virginia, New
York, Massachusetts and Indiana are devoid of impounding pro-
visions. Michigan has a provision for the deposit of the fiduciary's
own securities in lieu of the required bond, but has no provision
for the impounding of the securities of the trust estate. New Jersey
provides for the impounding of securities but there the problem of
the instant case is not likely to arise since no provision has been
made for maximum and minimum premium rates. N. J. STAT. ANN.
§§3:8-11-15 (1937).
Although the Ohio impounding statutes apply to all fiduciaries
and have been in effect for approximately thirteen years, this ap-
pears to be a case of first impression on the amount of premium to be
authorized where the securities or works of art have been im-
pounded. The case would seem to be correctly decided in view of
the apparent legislative intent that a saving should be accorded to
large trust estates and that the depository must be a trust company
or bank, itself financially responsible in the event of loss with
respect to that part of the estate.
William M. Cromer
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TORTS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-LiABmrrY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS UNDER
CIViL RIGHTS ACT
Action for damages against the superintendent of an Illinois
prison farm, alleging that plaintiff was, to the defendant's knowl-
edge, kept in a damp cell in solitary confinement for ninety-two
days, placed on a bread and water diet, and given no medical care.
Plaintiff alleged permanent injuries and asked $10,000 in damages,
basing his claim on the Civil Rights Act. 17 STAT. 13 (1871); 8 U.S.C.
§ 43 (1946). Held, motion to dismiss the complaint denied inasmuch
as it stated a cause of action. Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477
(E.D. Ill. 1948).
The Civil Rights Act provides a right of action sounding in tort
to any person who has been subjected by any other person acting
under color of any state statute, regulation, custom, or usage to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Picking v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 151 F. 2d 240 (C.C.A. 3d 1945).
It is an established rule of common law that a public officer is
not liable for damages resulting from his performance of discre-
tionary duties unless such be done maliciously or corruptly. Glad-
stone v. Galston, 145 F. 2d 742 (C.C.A. 9th 1944); Booth v. Fletcher,
101 F. 2d 676 (App. D.C. 1938); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. 2d 135
(App. D.C. 1938); People ex rel. Schreiner v. Courtney, 380 Ill. 171,
43 N.E. 2d 982 (1942); Lutes v. Thompson, 193 Okla. 331, 143 P. 2d
135 (1943). The Civil Rights Act makes no such exemption. It is ap-
plicable to any person and has been interpreted to impose strict lia-
bility upon public officers irrespective of intent. Refoule v. Ellis,
74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga. 1947); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
supra; Hague v. C.LO., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Valle v. Stengel, 75 F.
Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1948); Chapman v. King, 154 F. 2d 460 (C.C.A.
5th 1946). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted Sec-
tion 43, supra, to impose liability upon election judges whose de-
cisions were based on state statutes later declared unconstitutional.
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1931); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536 (1926); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). Apparently in
conflict, however, are judgments dismissing actions, brought under
this section, for failure to allege purposeful discrimination. Snow-
den v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943); Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.
2d 791 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
Section 43 of the present Act had its origin in the first Civil
Rights Act of April 9, 1866, which was enacted to secure to the negro
those civil rights to which the white race was entitled. The present
provision with minor changes in phraseology is in effect the third
Civil Rights Act of 1871 which had the same purpose. Hague v.
C.I.O., supra; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Sec-
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tion 41 of the Judicial Code by which the federal courts assume
jurisdiction of actions under Section 43, supra, confers jurisdiction
in all suits based on the deprivation of rights under any law of the
United States providing for equal rights. 36 STAT. 1092 (1911); 28
U.S.C. § 41 (14) (1946). The use of the term "equal rights" strongly
suggests that it applies to laws concerning racial discrimination and
inequity. 47 COL. L. REV. 1082 (1947). Apparently the Act was
passed solely for racial protection. It has, nevertheless, been fre-
quently utilized as the basis for actions which do not involve this
subject. Does the legislature intend that it be applicable to situa-
tions other than those involving racial questions thus extending
the possible circumvention of this common-law concept of exemp-
tion of public officers from tort liability? The failure of the legis-
lature to act to prevent such an extension is evidence of tacit
approval. The United States Supreme Court vigorously upheld
Section 52 of the Act, which imposes criminal liability for its viola-
tion, as necessary legislation for the enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Section
52 and Section 43, supra, should be read pan materia. Picking v.
Pennsylvania R.R., supra. Similarly, it is probable that Congress
considers these sections as watch dogs of civil rights.
J. Robert Donnelly
TORTS-LABLITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATION UNDER PURE FOOD
Am DRuG LAWS
The plaintiff bought a glass of orange juice in the cafeteria of a
charitable, non-profit corporation. She later contracted typhoid
fever. There was expert testimony that the orange juice had been
contaminated by a typhoid carrier, an employee of the defendant.
The trial court found no negligence on the part of the defendant in
employing the typhoid-carrying employee or in assigning her the
job of preparing orange juice. There was a breach of implied war-
ranty that the food was fit for human consumption. OHIO GEN. CODE
§ 8395 (1938). There was also a violation of the pure food and drug
laws of Ohio. OHIo GEN. CODE § 12758 (1939). Held, a breach of
implied warranty and a violation of the pure food and drug laws of
Ohio, when resulting in bodily injury, are both ex delicto and not
ex contractu. Therefore defendant is not liable because a charitable,
non-profit corporation is not responsible for the negligence of its
employees if not negligent in their selection or supervision. Lovich
v. Salvation Army, 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N. E. 2d 459 (1947).
Earlier Ohio decisions on tort liability of non-profit corporations
do not treat liability for breach of warranty and violation of the
pure food and drug laws, but in the present case the court was
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forced to decide this problem. The court looked to Yochem v. Gloria,
Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N. E. 2d 731 (1938), where breach of war-
ranty under Ohio General Code Section 8395 was declared a viola-
tion of the pure food and drug laws under Ohio General Code Sec-
tion 12758. In that case the court held that violation of Section
12758 constituted negligence per se. In the present case the court
said this made the action sound in tort and not in contract.
Granting that a violation of the Ohio pure food and drug laws
does sound in tort, is it a tort of the employee or the principal?
Ohio General Code Section 12758 reads: "Whoever manufactures
for sale, offers for sale a drug, article of food . . . ." This indicates
that the negligence is that of the vendor and not an employee.
In Ohio, as a general proposition, non-profit corporations are
not liable to beneficiaries for negligence of servants and employees.
Taylor v. Protestant Hospital, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N. E. 1089 (1911);
Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N. E. 2d 146 (1942). But non-
profit corporations are liable for negligence in hiring employees and
assigning them to jobs in which they injure beneficiaries. Taylor v.
Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E. 287 (1922); Cullen v. Schmit,
supra. The decisions reflect the reluctance of the courts to remove
immunity that has protected charitable institutions from tort
liability; however, some immunity was removed when the courts
held the defendant liable for negligence in hiring employees.
Non-profit corporations are becoming more numerous, more
powerful and are contacting more people; their opportunities for
causing tort injuries are increasing. Many non-profit corporations
daily feed large numbers of people who do not regard themselves as
beneficiaries of charity. It may be well to reconsider the merit of
non-liability. The courts have built the present law and probably
need not wait for legislation to change it. Many strong policy rea-
sons for liability are given by Mr. Justice Rutledge in Georgetown
College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (App. D. C. 1942). The present
decision indicates that losses resulting from breaches of warranty
and violations of the pure food and drug laws of Ohio will fall
directly and totally on the shoulders of the consumer where the
wrong-doing vendor is a non-profit corporation. The justice of such
a policy is questionable.
In its early history a breach of warranty was treated as a tort
but the trend is to treat it as a breach of contract. WILLISTON, SALES
§ 197 (2d ed. 1924). Some states permit either an action in tort or
an action in contract for breach of an implied warranty. Schuler
v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N. E. 2d 465 (1936). Yochem v.
Gloria, Inc., supra, makes such a breach a ground for a tort action
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but that decision would seem not to preclude the possibility of an
action in contract. No authority is given which bound the court to
reject the action in contract and with the law in its present state
of flux the court might have given the plaintiff such a cause of
action.
L. Dennis Marlowe

